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EMPIRE STATE INJUSTICE:
BASED UPON A DECADE OF NEW
INFORMATION, A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
OF HOW NEW YORK'S DEATH PENALTY
SYSTEM FAILS TO MEET STANDARDS FOR
ACCURACY AND FAIRNESSt
t This article is a report of the Committee on Capital Punishment of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York. This published version of the report contains a few minor non-
substantive changes from the original Association report, which is available at the Association's
website (http://www.abcny.org).
The report, which resulted from the work of a subcommittee of the Committee on Capital
Punishment, was originally presented to members of the New York Assembly Standing
Committees on Codes, Judiciary, and Correction in January 2005. At the time, the New York
Assembly was considering whether to pass a new death penalty law in light of the ruling of the
New York Court of Appeals that New York's death penalty statute violated the New York State
Constitution. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004). Following several hearings
on the death penalty over several months, the New York Assembly did not pass a new death
penalty law. See Patrick D. Healy, Death Penalty is Blocked by Democrats, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 13,
2005, at BI; Sam Roberts, Switch By a Former Supporter Shows Evolution of Death Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at Bl. In the future, New York or any other jurisdictions considering
whether to add or maintain a death penalty should consider the issues in this report and other
issues regarding capital punishment that the Committee has recently addressed. See also David
S. Hammer et al., Dying Twice: Conditions on New York's Death Row, 22 PACE L. REv. 347
(2002) (Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York regarding conditions on
New York's death row); Symposium, Dying Twice: Incarceration on Death Row, 31 CAP. U. L.
REv. 853 (2003).
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, an organization established in 1870
that is composed of more than 22,000 members, has a history of working for reforms of the
legal system. The Association has long been concerned with capital punishment and its
application, and it has taken the lead in the analysis of practical and legal issues relating to the
death penalty. In January 2005, Association President Bettina B. Plevan was among those who
testified before the New York Assembly Committees that were considering whether to pass a
new death penalty law.
The authors are grateful to members of the Committee on Capital Punishment who
assisted by reading and commenting on drafts of this report. The authors, in particular, express
their appreciation to Committee members Russell Neufeld, Jonathan Sussman and Ronald
Tabak.
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INTRODUCTION: A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
In striking down a provision of New York's death penalty law last
year and thereby initiating a moratorium on capital punishment, the
New York Court of Appeals created an important opportunity for the
legislature to re-examine New York's capital punishment system.' In the
years since 1995, when New York reinstated the death penalty, it has
become apparent that the death penalty does not function properly.
* Senior Counsel, International Justice Program, Human Rights Watch. J.D., Columbia
Law School, 1993. B.A., Brown University, 1989. Ms. Darehshori was the Chair of the Sub-
committee that wrote this report.
** Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. J.D., Case Western Re-
serve University School of Law, 1989. B.A., Case Western Reserve University, 1984. Professor
Kirchmeier was the Chair of the Committee on Capital Punishment when this report was writ-
ten and submitted to the New York Assembly.
*** Attorney-at-law. J.D., Georgia State University, 1986. M.S.W., Catholic University of
America, 1981. B.A., George Washington University, 1979.
Associate Professor, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York.
J.D., Harvard Law School, 1992. A.B., Harvard College, 1989.
1 See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004).
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Since 1995, press reports and studies have shown that numerous
people have been erroneously convicted of capital crimes. The risk of
executing innocent persons became clearer as advances in DNA technol-
ogy conclusively showed that innocent people came perilously close to
being executed.2 Examination of how innocent people ended up on
death row in these cases reveals a variety of systemic errors that may exist
in a far larger number of cases. DNA evidence, of course, is not a solu-
tion by itself. In many capital cases, DNA evidence may not exist and
thus cannot help exonerate the unknown number of innocent people
condemned to death. 3
The Empire State is far from immune to these risks. In December
2002, Newsday reported that it found eleven New York cases involving
thirteen men who were wrongly convicted of murder in the preceding
five years. These wrongful convictions resulted from significant flaws
in New York's system-flaws that have not yet been rectified and could
still lead to the execution of innocent people.
Flaws such as those found in New York's system lead not only to
the conviction of innocent defendants, but also to death sentences that
are applied unfairly and arbitrarily. In 2000, for example, a team of
researchers headed by Professor James Liebman at Columbia University
released results of an extensive national study in which they found a
stunning 68 percent appellate reversal rate in capital prosecutions.'
2 Further, there may be executed innocents for whom DNA tests will never be ordered or
taken.
3 See RICHARD C. DIETER, INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN DEATH PEN-
ALTY: A DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER REPORT § V (2004) (noting that DNA evi-
dence was responsible for only 12 percent of the 116 recent exonerations of death row inmates),
available at http://wvw.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did= 1150.
4 Sean Gardiner, Dynamics ofRighting a Wrong: The DA 's Role in Reversals, NEWSDAY (New
York), Dec. 10, 2002, at A35; see also Sean Gardiner, For Them, No justice: Bad Convictions Put
13 Men in Prison, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 8, 2002, at A3; Sean Gardiner, Getting it Right:
Experts Eye Measures to Prevent Injustices, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 11, 2002, at A8; Sean
Gardiner & Herbert Lowe, Free to Struggle, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 9, 2002, at A6; Herbert
Lowe, Friend Becomes Freedom Fighter, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 10, 2002, at A7; Graham
Rayman, Wrongfully Convicted, Two Pursue Cash Awards, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 14, 2002,
at A31.
5 JAMES S. LEIBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-
1995 (2000), available at http://www.justice.policy.net/cjedfund/jreport. An abridged version
of the report is available in James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital
Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1839 (2000). See also United States v. Quinones, 205
F.Supp.2d 256, 264-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing evidence showing a high risk of executing
innocent persons), rev'd, 313 F.3d 49, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that Congress enacted
death penalty legislation despite the risk of executing innocent people).
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The concerns about the operation of the death penalty that have
been raised recently across the country by judges, prosecutors and vari-
ous commentators have resulted in several studies and recommendations
for ways to improve capital punishment systems.6 The discovery of thir-
teen wrongfully convicted men on death row in Illinois led Governor
George Ryan to appoint a commission to study the possibility of error
in capital sentencing.7 Ultimately, following the commission's report
on problems with both capital convictions and capital sentences, the
governor commuted the sentences of everyone on Illinois' death row.'
In 2002, after careful study, the Illinois Commission issued a set of
recommendations aimed at reducing the possibility of error in capital
cases.9 These recommendations range from changes in police practices
that would help minimize false confessions, to independent scientific
review of forensic evidence.10 A comparison of the Illinois Commission
recommendations to current procedures in New York shows that New
York law falls short in many respects.
In September 2003, following the Illinois Commission report, the
Republican governor of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney, seeking to initiate
the death penalty in Massachusetts but wary of problems other states
were having with it, created the Massachusetts Governor's Council on
Capital Punishment." The council's objective was to offer proposals for
legal and forensic safeguards that would be necessary before a fair death
penalty statute could be considered in Massachusetts.12 The council
6 See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Move-
ment in the United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 21-71 (2002); Ronald J. Tabak, Finality
Without Fairness: Why We are Moving Towards Moratoria on Evecutions, and the Potential Aboli-
tion of Capital Punishment, 33 CONN. L. REv. 733, 734-45 (2001).
7 Kirchmeier, supra note 6, at 40, 44-45.
8 Id. at 44-45.
9 See REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
(2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccplccp/reports/commission-reportlindex.html
[hereinafter ILL. REPORT].
10 See id.
II Press Release, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Department, Romney
Takes Scientific Approach to Death Penalty: Tasks Panel With Crafting Narrow Death Penalty
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made ten recommendations for safeguards it deemed necessary to mini-
mize the risk of executing innocent people; nine of those recommenda-
tions are inconsistent with New York's current death penalty law.
Of course, the only way New York can be sure to resolve the
problems with capital punishment and entirely eliminate the risk of exe-
cuting innocent persons is for the legislature not to bring back the death
penalty.' 3  However, in the event the legislature considers whether to
reinstate the death penalty, this report provides some guidance to the
discussion of problems with New York's death penalty and proposes
some essential procedural reforms.
This report touches on some of the areas in which New York law
fails to meet the minimum recommendations advocated in the Illinois
and Massachusetts reports. The recommendations in those reports arise
from extensive studies, by qualified experts, of how to minimize signifi-
cant accuracy and fairness problems. Thus, New York should not move
forward without giving them full consideration. This report discusses
rules regarding informant testimony, rules regarding witness testimony
and scientific corroboration, the importance of videotaped interroga-
tions, rules regarding lineup procedures, the value of independent re-
view of scientific evidence, the need for a narrower list of death penalty
eligibility factors, the importance of different juries for each stage of a
bifurcated capital trial, the need for a heightened burden of proof, the
need for judicial discretion to overturn death sentences, and the need for
an ongoing capital punishment review commission. The issues we raise
have particular resonance when the defendant faces the ultimate irrevers-
ible penalty of death.
This report is an initial investigation of some of the areas that
would need to be addressed in any capital punishment regime, and is
not an exhaustive examination of the problems with New York's capital
punishment system. The recommendations discussed here relate solely
to some issues of guilt and innocence, eligibility for the death penalty,
and jury selection. A large number of the Illinois and Massachusetts
recommendations are not included here, but almost all of the recom-
mendations require further investigation and consideration in New
13 For this reason and others addressed in prior reports and statements, the Association
maintains its opposition to capital punishment. See, e.g., Comm. on Civil Rights, The Death
Penalty, 39 REc. Ass'N B. CiTy N.Y. 419 (1984); Comm. on Civil Rights, The Death Penalty: It
Should Be Abolished, 32 REc. Ass'N B. Ciry N.Y. 225 (1977). The submission of the suggestions
in this Report for consideration by the New York Legislature does not alter the Association's
view that the death penalty should not be reinstated in New York.
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York. In short, prior to making any decisions about a death penalty
statute, at a minimum, there needs to be a thorough consideration and
analysis of the existing statute in light of new information bearing on
the danger of unfair outcomes under the current statutory scheme.
I. INFORMANT TESTIMONY RULES
A. Importance of Rules for Informant Testimony in Capital Cases
Noting that several wrongful capital convictions involved testi-
mony by unreliable parties, the Massachusetts Council recommended
that the jury be instructed that "statements by codefendants or infor-
mants, especially when the codefendant or informant receives or hopes
to receive any benefit from the state (such as a reduction of criminal
charge or sentence), may be unreliable, and should therefore be evalu-
ated with great care."14 If any benefit was received by the codefendant
or informant in exchange for the statement, "the jury must be told
about the benefit."15
The Illinois Commission similarly recommended that a pattern
jury instruction should be adopted "providing a special caution with
respect to the reliability of the testimony of in-custody informants."16
The commission unanimously agreed that the "testimony from in-cus-
tody informants presented particular problems, which mandated special
procedures calculated to insure that such witnesses were reliable."' 7 It
found that false testimony from in-custody witnesses played a part in
several of the thirteen cases of men released from death row in Illinois.18
In addition to the Illinois cases, the Illinois Commission consid-
ered criminal justice literature and reports. In particular, the report
considered a major inquiry into wrongful convictions in Canada.19 The
special commissioner in the "Morin Inquiry," as it was known, recom-
mended substantive policy changes that "emphasized the importance of
establishing the credibility of the informer's testimony through corrobo-
rative evidence and careful examination of the circumstances under
which the informer made his statement."2 The Morin Inquiry consid-
14 MASs. REPORT, supra note 12, Recommendation 5, at 19.
'5 Id.
16 ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, Recommendation 57, at 131-32.
17 ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, Recommendation 52, at 122.
18 ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, at 7-8, 120, 132.
19 Id. at 21.
20 Id. at 122-23.
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ered another investigation into the use of in-custody informant testi-
mony in Los Angeles between 1979 and 1990 that found numerous
instances in which false informant testimony had been used.2 1
The Illinois Commission concluded, "In light of the frequency
with which [in-custody] testimony has appeared in the cases of those
who were ultimately released from death row, the Commission believes
that a special emphasis on this credibility issue is warranted." 2 2 It rec-
ommended both a pre-trial evidentiary hearing to determine the reliabil-
ity of the in-custody informant's testimony at either the guilt or
sentencing phase and pattern jury instructions cautioning jurors about
the value of such testimony.2 3
B. New York Law Regarding Informant Testimony
Although New York has long viewed self-interested witnesses with
suspicion, New York criminal procedure law does not specifically ad-
dress the reliability of in-custody informant testimony. Before taking
any action on reinstating the death penalty in New York, the legislature
should consider treating informant testimony with the same scrutiny as
accomplice testimony in capital cases. In accomplice cases, New York
criminal procedure law requires corroborating evidence, in addition to
that furnished by the accomplice, tending to connect the defendant with
the commission of the crime.2 4 The purpose of the accomplice statute is
to protect the defendant against the risk of a motivated fabrication, and
to insist on proof other than testimony from a possibly unreliable or
self-interested accomplice.2 5 The reports from other states found that
jurors should be instructed to apply the same caution to the testimony
of in-custody witnesses.26 In New York, the model jury instructions
that apply to accomplice testimony can easily be altered to reflect this
concern. 2 7
21 Id
22 Id. at 132.
23 ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, Recommendations 52 and 57, at 122-23, 131-32.
24 N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 60.22 (McKinney 2003).
25 People v. Gaines, 87 A.D.2d 616, 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
26 See, e.g., ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, Recommendation 57, at 131-32. MAss. REPORT,
supra note 12, Recommendation 5, at 19.
27 Parts of Model Charge 4:2 may be modified as follows:
1. The testimony of [an in-custody informant], if credited by the jury may ...
not . .. prove that the defendant committed [the crime], providing there is other truly
independent proof to satisfy the tending-to-connect requirement.
2006]1 91
92 CARDOZO PUB. LAW POLICY &r ETHICS J
II. WITNESS TESTIMONY AND SCIENTIFIC CORROBORATION RULES
A. Importance of Rules for Witness Testimony and Scientific
Corroboration in Capital Cases
The Massachusetts Council took particular note of the unreliability
of eyewitness testimony. It found a common theme that many wrong-
ful convictions involved erroneous eyewitness testimony.2 8 The council
considered scientific research that documents the unreliability of eyewit-
ness testimony, especially regarding cross-racial identification. To ad-
dress this problem, the Massachusetts Council recommended that the
jury be instructed at both the guilt-innocence and sentencing phases,
that "(1) eyewitness testimony, even from a confident eyewitness, may
be unreliable, especially in connection with extremely emotional events
such as murder, and should therefore be evaluated with great care; (2)
cross-racial identification may be particularly unreliable." 29
In addition to jury instructions, the Massachusetts Council sug-
gested a further measure to safeguard against convictions based on erro-
neous witness testimony. It recommended that, at the capital
sentencing phase, the jury be required to find that "there is conclusive
scientific evidence (i.e., physical or other associative evidence), reaching
a high level of scientific certainty, that connects the defendant to either
the location of the crime scene, the murder weapon, or the victim's
body, and that strongly corroborates the defendant's guilt of capital
2. The independent evidence may not depend for its weight and probative value
upon the testimony of the [in-custody informant].
3. The purpose of the corroboration requirement is ... to protect the defendant
against the risk of a motivated fabrication, and to insist upon proof other than that
which originates from a possibly unreliable or self-interested [witness].
9. Traditionally the law has viewed [the testimony of in-custody informants]
with a suspicious eye.
10. Although an [in-custody informant] is competent to testify as a witness, his
testimony may often lack the inherent trustworthiness of a disinterested witness.
11. One who [is in custody] and testifies against another might be doing so in
order to curry favor with authorities.
12. Courts have exercised the utmost caution in dealing with [in-custody in-
formant] testimony, especially when testimony is exchanged for immunity or other
favorable prosecutorial consideration.
1 HOWARD G. LEVENTHAL, CHARGES TO JURY CRIM. CASE § 4:2 (revised ed. 1988 & Supp.
2005), available at CTJNY § 4:2 (Westlaw through 2005).




murder" prior to the imposition of a death sentence.3 o The council
stated that this requirement "should not be subject to waiver by the
defendant, because society itself has a compelling interest in ensuring
that no innocent person ever receives a sentence of capital punish-
ment." ' The council recognized the possibility that a defendant could
be sentenced to a lengthy prison term on the basis of erroneous human
evidence, but at least in a non-capital case there remained the opportu-
nity for the justice system to correct its mistake.32
Although the Illinois Commission did not recommend requiring
scientific corroboration for a conviction as the Massachusetts Council
did, it also found that cases involving in-custody informants, accom-
plices and single eyewitnesses were the most problematic cases in which
to reliably determine whether the death penalty should be imposed.3 3
In addition to modifications to trial practice and police procedure to
help address some of these issues, the Illinois Commission ultimately
recommended that the death penalty not be imposed on the basis of
uncorroborated testimony from a single eyewitness, accomplice, or in-
formant. Recommendation 69 states as follows:
Illinois should adopt a statute which provides:
A. The uncorroborated testimony of an in-custody informant witness
concerning the confession or admission of the defendant may not be
the sole basis for imposition of a death penalty.
B. Convictions for murder based upon the testimony of a single eye-
witness or accomplice, without any other corroboration, should not be
death eligible under any circumstances.
Even with a pre-trial hearing to assess the reliability of an in-cus-
tody informant and a special curative instruction, the Illinois Commis-
sion concluded that the potential for testimony of questionable
reliability remained high. As noted in the previous section, the Illinois
Commission found that a number of cases in Illinois in which the de-
fendants were released from death row "involved proffers of testimony
from in-custody informants of dubious veracity."3 5 It therefore deter-
30 MAss. REPORT, supra note 12, Recommendation 6, at 20.
31 Id. at 21.
32 Id.
33 ILL. REPORr, supra note 9, Recommendation 69, at 158-59.
34 Id.
35 Id at 159.
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mined that the death penalty should not be imposed if the conviction is
based solely on the testimony of an in-custody informant. Similarly, the
Illinois Commission found that an accomplice might have just as much
incentive as a jailhouse informant to shade the truth in a manner that is
beneficial to the accomplice. It noted that at least two of the Illinois
convictions in which the defendants were released from death row were
based on accomplice testimony.36
The Illinois Commission also recognized legitimate concern about
the reliability of eyewitness testimony. It recommended some ways to
alleviate this problem, such as new methods of conducting police line-
ups and photo spreads, admissibility in appropriate cases of expert testi-
mony regarding the fallibility of eyewitness testimony, and revisions to
jury instructions on eyewitness testimony. However, the commission
still concluded that the dangers of eyewitness testimony were great
enough to recommend that eligibility for the death penalty never be
based on the testimony of a single eyewitness.3 1
Illinois has since adopted legislation to address this recommenda-
tion. As part of a death penalty reform package effective November 19,
2003, the Illinois Legislature made it possible to retract death-eligibility
based on limited evidence.3 9 At the close of the prosecution's case, the
defendant or the court may move to decertify the case as a capital case
"if the court finds that the only evidence supporting the defendant's
conviction is the uncorroborated testimony of an informant witness . . .
concerning the confession or admission of the defendant or that the sole
evidence against the defendant is a single eyewitness or single accom-
plice without any other corroborating evidence."o During discovery,
the state is also required to provide the defense with information con-
cerning jailhouse informants, including criminal history, inducements
for testimony, details of the purported statements of the accused,
whether the informant ever recanted, other cases in which the informant
3 6 Id.
37 Id. at 160.
3 8 Id
39 See Act of Nov. 19, 2003, Pub. Act No. 93-605, § 10, 2003 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3246 (West).
For a discussion of some other actions taken by the Illinois General Assembly in response to the
Illinois Commission's recommendations; see Thomas P. Sullivan, Capital Punishment Reorm:
What's Been Done and What Remains to Be Done, 51 FED. LAw. 37 (2004).
40 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-l(h-5) (West Supp. 2005).
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testified and whether inducements were offered in those case(s), and any
other information relevant to the credibility of the witness.4 1
B. New York Law Regarding Witness Testimony and
Scientific Corroboration
As mentioned above, New York has a corroboration statute applica-
ble only to accomplice testimony.4 2 It has no statute addressing corrob-
oration requirements for in-custody informants or cases that rely solely
on the testimony of a single eyewitness. Section 60.22(1) of the New
York Criminal Procedure Law reads as follows:
A defendant may not be convicted of any offense upon the testimony
of an accomplice unsupported by corroborative evidence tending to
connect the defendant with the commission of such offense.43
As discussed above, the purpose of the statute is to protect defendants
against the risk of conviction based solely upon testimony from a possi-
bly unreliable or self-interested accomplice. 4 Because in-custody infor-
mants have similar motives to fabricate testimony in order to curry favor
with the state, the New York Legislature should not consider reinstitut-
ing capital punishment without first addressing such other potentially
unreliable testimony.
Similarly, in order to reduce the chances of wrongful imposition of
the death penalty, if the legislature contemplates reinstating capital pun-
ishment, it should consider expanding the statute to prohibit the impo-
sition of a death sentence based on the testimony of a single eyewitness.
Many studies, as well as the spate of convictions that have recently been
overturned, demonstrate the inherent fallibility of eyewitness identifica-
tion testimony. 5 One study of forty convicts who were subsequently
exonerated by DNA analysis indicated that 90 percent of the trials re-
41 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21(c) (West Supp. 2005).
42 See discussion supra Part I.B.
43 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.22(1) (McKinney 2003).
44 See discussion supra Part I.B.
45 See, e.g., Margery Malkin Koosed, The Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won't-Unless It
Also Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness Identifications, 63 OHIO Sr. L.J. 263, 271-87 (2002); Edward
Stein, The Admissibility ofExpert Testimony About Cognitive Science Research on Eyewitness Identi-
fication, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 295 (2003).
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sulting in conviction involved faulty eyewitness identification. 6 Of the
thirteen wrongfully convicted men featured in the Newsday article,
"[t]en . . . were put behind bars largely on the word of a single
eyewitness."17
To decrease the chances of an innocent person being executed, the
Massachusetts Council recommended requiring physical or other as-
sociative evidence strongly corroborating guilt in order for a defendant
in a murder case to be eligible for a death sentence. If New York
considers adopting the Massachusetts recommendation for capital cases,
it should also require that corroborating evidence comport with the sci-
entific standards discussed in Part V of this report, infa.
III. VIDEOTAPING INTERROGATIONS
A. Importance of Videotaping Interrogations in Capital Cases
The death penalty studies from both Illinois and Massachusetts
found that cases of wrongful conviction often involved failures in
human evidence such as erroneous eyewitness testimony, false confes-
sions, or testimony from an in-custody informant or codefendant.
The Massachusetts Council's report recommended that statements
made by defendants while in police custody "should be contemporane-
ously audio- or video-recorded in their entirety, and the lack of such a
recording should be considered when evaluating the reliability of such a
statement."5 0  It also recommended that the jury be instructed that
"statements made by the defendant while in police custody are not al-
ways inherently reliable, and should therefore be evaluated with care."51
The council noted that recent experience has shown that police may
pressure a defendant in order to extract a statement, and that statements
made in custody may therefore not always be reliable. 5 2 Although the
46 Gary L. Wells et al., Witnesses to Crime: Social and Cognitive Factors Governing the Validity
ofPeople's Reports, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 53, 57 (Ronald Roesch
et al. eds., 1999).
47 Sean Gardiner, For Them, No justice: Bad Convictions Put 13 Men in Prison, NEWSDAY
(New York), Dec. 8, 2002, at A3.
48 MASS REPORT, supra note 12, Recommendation 5, at 19.
49 Id. See also ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, at 158-59.
50 MASs. REPORT, supra note 12, at 19.
51 MASS. REPORT, supra note 12, Recommendation 5, at 19.
52 MASs. REPORT, supra note 12, at 19-20.
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council noted that it was beyond its purview to mandate audio- or
video-recording, it encouraged the practice.
The Illinois Commission, which had a broader mandate with re-
spect to police procedures, made the following specific recommenda-
tions for videotaping statements:
Recommendation 4:
Custodial interrogations of a suspect in a homicide case occurring at a
police facility should be videotaped. Videotaping should not include
merely the statement made by the suspect after interrogation, but the
entire interrogation process.
Recommendation 5:
Any statements by a homicide suspect which are not recorded should
be repeated to the suspect on tape, and his or her comments recorded.
Recommendation 6:
There are circumstances in which videotaping may not be practical,
and some uniform method of recording such interrogations, such as
tape recording, should be established. Police investigators should carry
tape recorders for use when interviewing suspects in homicide cases
outside the station, and all such interviews should be audiotaped.
Recommendation 8:
The police should electronically record interviews conducted of signif-
icant witnesses in homicide cases where it is reasonably foreseeable
that their testimony may be challenged at trial."
The Illinois Commission noted the serious problem of suspects
confessing to crimes for which they are later exonerated. In at least one
of the cases of the thirteen men who were released from death row in
Illinois, others were subsequently convicted for a crime to which the
defendant had allegedly confessed. In order to ensure that confessions
are not made in circumstances that provide significant doubt as to their
accuracy, and in order to alleviate the problems associated with disputes
between police and defendants as to what happens behind closed doors
5 3 Id
54 ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, Recommendations 4-6, 8 at 24-30.
55 ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, at 8.
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at police stations, the Illinois Commission recommended videotaping
the entire interrogation process.16
The Illinois Commission found that videotaping the entire interro-
gation process of a suspect is important for a number of reasons. First,
it helps prevent the admission of false confessions by allowing courts to
"'monitor interrogation practices and thereby enforce other safe-
guards.'" 7 Second, the presence of a video camera "'deters the police
from employing interrogation methods likely to lead to untrustworthy
confessions. Third, it enables courts to make more informed decisions
about whether interrogation practices were likely to lead to an untrust-
worthy confession.""' Additionally, videotaping interrogations offers
several potential benefits to law enforcement, including providing the
best evidence that interrogation practices did not include physical coer-
cion or undue influence."
The Illinois Commission noted that both Alaska and Minnesota
have mandated, by judicial interpretation, that interrogations be re-
corded. For example, the Alaskan Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the Alaska Constitution requires that all custodial in-
terrogations be recorded from beginning to end.6 0 The Alaska court
reasoned that such recordings not only protect defendants, but also aid
law enforcement:
The recording of custodial interrogations is not, however, a measure
intended to protect only the accused; a recording also protects the
public's interest in honest and effective law enforcement, and the indi-
vidual interests of those police officers wrongfully accused of improper
tactics. A recording, in many cases, will aid law enforcement efforts,
by confirming the content and the voluntariness of a confession, when
a defendant changes his testimony or claims falsely that his constitu-
tional rights were violated. In any case, a recording will help trial and
appellate courts to ascertain the truth. 1
Although a majority of the Illinois Commission members believed
that videotaping the entire interrogation process is crucial to the fair
56 Id. at 24-25.
57 Id. at 25 (quoting Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards
Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 105, 153-54 (1997)).
5 8 Id
59 Id. at 25 (citation omitted).
60 Stephan v. Alaska, 711 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Alaska 1985).
61 Id. at 1161.
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administration of justice, they were sensitive to concerns expressed by
various police departments that videotaping interrogations may inhibit
the police from rigorously pursuing interrogations.6 2 In response to
these concerns, the commission cited a 1993 National Institute of Jus-
tice study, which found that once police had "adjusted to the idea of
being videotaped, they found the process useful." 6 3 The study found
that allegations of police misconduct dropped, and that videotaped con-
fessions "assisted prosecutors and defense lawyers in evaluating cases,
helped in negotiations for pleas of guilty, and resulted in more guilty
pleas. "64
In July 2003, a year after the Illinois Commission's report was fi-
nalized, both houses of the Illinois Legislature approved a bill providing
that statements made by suspects in murder cases, resulting from custo-
dial interrogation occurring in a place of detention, are presumptively
inadmissible unless the interrogation was recorded in its entirety.6' The
presumption can be overcome if it is shown, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the statement was voluntary and is reliable based on the
totality of the circumstances. Otherwise inadmissible statements may
still be used for impeachment purposes. This bill has since been signed
into law.6
Since the Illinois Commission's report was issued, the benefits of
videotaping interrogations have been further substantiated in a study
conducted by the co-chair of the Illinois Commission, Thomas P. Sulli-
van. 6 7 His study examined the experiences of 238 police and sheriffs
departments that voluntarily used electronic recordings in interrogation
rooms.6' The resulting report confirmed the Illinois Commission's con-
clusion that recording is an efficient and powerful law enforcement
tool.69  "Recordings prevent[ed] disputes about officers' conduct, the
62 See ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, at 27.
63 Id.
6 4 Id.
65 S. 15, 93d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2003).
66 Act of Aug. 12, 2003, Pub. Act No. 93-517, § 25, 2003 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2600 (West); see
also Act of Nov. 19, 2003, Pub. Act No. 93-605, § 5, 2003 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1344 (West) (estab-
lishing a pilot program for videotaping interrogations).
67 THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGA-
TIONS (Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Special Report No. 1,
2004), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/documents/Sul-
livanReport.pdf.
6 8 Idu
69 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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treatment of suspects and statements they made."7 0 The study found
that "[v]irtually every officer with whom we spoke, having given custo-
dial recordings a try, was enthusiastically in favor of the practice."7 1 Po-
lice were pleased to be able to focus on the interview rather than on
note-taking. 72 "[R]ecordings dramatically reduce[d] the number of de-
fense motions to suppress statements," resulted in more guilty pleas, and
when the cases went to trial, were great evidence for the jury and for
trial and reviewing court judges.73 Other benefits included increased
public confidence and approval of police practices, and that the videos
could be used to teach interrogation practices to detectives.
The commonly feared drawbacks to recording interrogations-that
suspects would not cooperate and that costs would be excessive-were
considered unfounded by veteran officers using the procedures. Those
interviewed stated that recording did not cause suspects to refuse to be
interviewed or fail to cooperate. In many cases the recording is covert;
however, even in places where the suspect was informed of the record-
ing, the suspect's awareness was not a hindrance because the suspect
focused on the subject of the interview.76 Also, recording in some
places, like Alaska and Minnesota, is not mandatory when the suspect
objects. Therefore the interview can be continued even after the re-
corder is turned off. 77 The report also found that benefits in other areas,
including an offset by savings in frivolous litigation, outweighed the cost
of equipment.7 ' The cost of videotaping interrogations may also be
minimized by the fact that many police departments already possess and
use videotaping technology for a variety of purposes.
Aside from the Sullivan study, other recent research provides sup-
port for enacting a law requiring videotaping of the entire interrogation.
A recent study by the Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law indicates that false confessions may be an even more
serious problem than the Illinois Commission understood. The study
70 SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 6.
71 Id
72 Id at 10.
7 Id. at 6-12.
74 Id. at 16.
7 Id at 10.
76 Id. at 2 1.
7 Id. at 21.
78 Id. at 10 (citing INT'L Ass'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, EXECUTIVE BRIEF: THE USE OF
CCTViVIDEO CAMERAS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 5-6 (2001)).
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documented the seriousness of the false confession problem, finding that
false confessions were given in 23 percent of cases in which a person was
exonerated after conviction. Social psychologist Richard Ofshe has
suggested that the number of false confessions could be as high as 60
percent.o Thus, the videotaping of interrogations is important to limit-
ing false confessions and wrongful convictions in capital cases.
B. New York Law Regarding Recording Interrogations.
For the reasons discussed above, any effort to reinstate the death
penalty in New York should include serious consideration of mandating
electronic recording of suspect interrogations from the very beginning of
questioning in potential capital cases." It is common in New York City
and other jurisdictions for confessions to be videotaped; therefore, ex-
panding recording to include interrogations would not be as great a bur-
den as some opponents may claim.
The New York City Council and New York State Assembly have
both considered bills that would require videotaping of interrogations.
A bill introduced in the New York State Assembly in 2004 addressed
many of the concerns raised by proponents and opponents of electronic
recording of interrogations.8 2 The bill called for both audio- and video-
recording for all felonies, yet remained flexible by incorporating excep-
tions.8 3 It provided for training in the new technology, and required
preservation of recordings through an individual's appeals and habeas
corpus petitions."
However, the 2004 Assembly bill did not meet the standards of the
Illinois Commission recommendations. For example, the bill only
would have required electronic recording for custodial interrogations of
a felony suspect that occur in a place of detention." The Illinois Com-
mission recognized that many important interrogations take place in the
79 Editorial, Crime, False Convictions and Videotape, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 2003, at A22.
80 Gail Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic Record-
ing of Custodial Interrogations, 6 B.U. Pus. INT. L.J. 719, 729 (1997).
81 The New York State Bar Association supports the videotaping of interrogations. See NY
State Bar Assn. Supports Videotaping of Police Interrogations, DAILY RECORD (Rochester, N.Y.),
June 25, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WL 63189950.
82 Assemb. 5162, 2003 Leg., 226th Sess. (N.Y. 2003).
83 Id; see also S. 6913, 2004 Leg., 227th Sess. (N.Y. 2004).
84 Assemb. 5162, 2003 Leg., 226th Sess. (N.Y. 2003); see also S. 6913, 2004 Leg., 227th
Sess. (N.Y. 2004); Int. No. 122, New York City Council (2004).
85 Assemb. 5162, 2003 Leg., 226th Sess. (N.Y. 2003); see also S. 6913, 2004 Leg., 227th
Sess. (N.Y. 2004).
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field, and recommended that police investigators carry tape recorders to
use in interviewing homicide suspects outside the station."
The 2004 bill also did not specify when recording should begin.
Given the bill's requirement that the administration of Miranda8 7 warn-
ings and any waiver be recorded, it appears that the bill would have
called for all subsequent interrogation to be recorded." However, there
is considerable litigation on timing of Miranda warnings, and it may be
in the interest of judicial efficiency for any recording proposal to be
more precise about its timing requirement.
In evaluating the use of recorded interrogations in capital cases,
consideration should also be given to whether recording the interviews
of witnesses and victims in felony cases would provide additional bene-
fits. Witnesses, especially accomplices, may be subject to the same po-
lice coercion and suggestive questioning as suspects. The Illinois
Commission recommended that police record interviews with signifi-
cant witnesses so that if a witness's account changes, the judge and jury
can see the witness's original version." In the cases of the thirteen men
released from death row in Illinois, the Illinois Commission found that
there were a number of witnesses whose testimony was questionable,
and that a videotape of the initial interrogation might have aided the
resolution of questions related to their testimony.9 o
In deciding whether or not to reinstate the death penalty, the legis-
lature should consider additional safeguards to ensure that suspects are
not unduly pressured to waive the recording of their interrogation. For
example, the 2004 Assembly bill would have created an exception to the
presumption of inadmissibility for unrecorded statements where the sus-
pects refused to speak if recorded.9' In addition to requiring that the
suspect's statement agreeing to respond only if no recording is made be
recorded, a new statute could require recorded statements from the in-
terrogator and the suspect as to whether any pre-waiver interrogation or
discussion had taken place. This requirement could reveal improprieties
and give the suspect an opportunity to object to his or her treatment.
The Illinois Commission also recommended that any un-recorded state-
86 ILL REPORT, supra note 9, at 28-29.
87 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
88 Assemb. 5162, 2003 Leg., 226th Sess. (N.Y. 2003).
89 ILL REPORT, supra note 9, Recommendation 8, at 30.
90 Id.
91 Assemb. 5162, 2003 Leg., 226th Sess. (N.Y. 2003).
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ments be repeated to the suspect on tape, and his or her comments
recorded. 92
A corollary to the use of the videotaping procedure might be a
higher standard of proof for the applicability of exceptions. Videotaping
proposals considered in Louisiana, Missouri, and New Mexico required
that the applicability of any exceptions be shown by "clear and convinc-
ing evidence."9 3 An initial proposal in Illinois applied the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard to one exception, that videotaping was
not feasible, while the state was required to prove the other exceptions
only by a "preponderance of the evidence."' The "clear and convincing
evidence" standard can be adopted for all exceptions or only those
thought to be open to abuse.
A final point to consider in thinking through an interrogation
videotaping procedure is the importance of evaluating and, where ap-
propriate, incorporating new research and technological changes. Such
information bearing on electronic recording of interrogations should be
evaluated and incorporated as new discoveries are made.9
In conclusion, major studies have found that videotaping interro-
gations would greatly improve the reliability of the convictions obtained
in capital cases. In New York, these procedures should be evaluated
prior to the consideration of reestablishing the death penalty.
92 ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, Recommendation 5, at 28.
93 S.B. 734, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2004); S.B. 231, 92nd Gen. Assem., Ist Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2003); H.B. 549, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2003).
94 Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of Inter-
rogations is the Solution to Illinois' Problem of False Confessions, 32 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 337, 388
(2001) (discussing House Bill 4697, which failed to pass in the 2000 session of the Illinois
General Assembly).
95 For example, a recent study found that the camera angle in an interrogation room could
have a significant impact. In an article published in Current Directions in Psychological Science, a
journal of the American Psychological Society, Daniel G. Lassiter described a phenomenon
called "illusory causation" finding that when the camera focuses directly on a suspect, mock
jurors were more likely to think that a recorded confession was voluntary and that the suspect
was guilty. These mock jurors also recommended more severe sentences. Lassiter's study found
that using a camera focused equally on the interrogator and suspect, or even an audiotape or
transcript of the interrogation, was less prejudicial. Daniel G. Lassiter, Illusory Causation in the
Courtroom, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. Sci. 204, 204-08 (2002).
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IV. LINEUP PROCEDURES
A. Importance of Lineup Procedure Practices in Capital Cases
As part of its findings regarding the unreliability of eyewitness tes-
timony as a source of error in capital cases, the Illinois Commission
found that in some cases, witnesses had participated in pretrial lineups
that may have impacted their ultimate courtroom testimony. Because of
the notorious suggestiveness of police lineup practices, the Illinois Com-
mission made the following recommendations to ensure that pretrial
lineups do not taint the reliability of identifications in capital
prosecutions:
Recommendation 10:
When practicable, police departments should insure that the person
who conducts the lineup or photospread should not be aware of which
member of the lineup or photo spread is the suspect.
Recommendation 12:
If the administrator of the lineup does not know who the suspect is, a
sequential procedure should be used, so that the eyewitness views only
one lineup member or photo at a time and makes a decision regarding
each person or photo before viewing another lineup member ....
Recommendation 15:
When practicable, the police should videotape lineup procedures, in-
cluding the witness' confidence statement.96
The concern with the suggestiveness of lineup procedures is not
unique to Illinois. Social psychologists have long commented on the
inherent unreliability of police station lineup procedures.97 In unusual
or threatening situations, people are prone to judge the appropriateness
of their behavior by relying on others in a position of trust-such as the
officer administering the lineup. "Conformity [to authority] is at its
96 ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, Recommendations 10, 12, 15, at 32-39. Additionally, Rec-
ommendation 11(a) notes that "[e]yewitnesses should be told explicitly that the suspected perpe-
trator might not be in the lineup or photospread." Id. at 34. A "witness' confidence statement,
as mentioned in Recommendation 15, is defined in Recommendation 14 as a statement made
by the eyewitness "as to his or her confidence that the identified person is or is not the actual
culprit." Id. at 37.
97 Gary Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and
Photospreads, 22 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 603 (1998).
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peak when pressure is high and when judgments are made without
anonymity."98
The recommendation for double-blind lineups would have particu-
lar importance in capital cases. A double-blind lineup is one in which
neither the administrator nor the witness knows the suspect's identity in
advance. This procedure helps eliminate the problem of unintentional
verbal and body cues given by the lineup administrator that encourage
the witness to choose the person the administrator has in mind as the
likely perpetrator.99
Regarding the other recommendations, research has shown that the
use of sequential identification procedures significantly increases the ac-
curacy of identifications, "because the witness is required to make an
absolute judgment as to each individual person or photo, rather than
what often is a relative judgment as to which one among those displayed
at the same time most resembles the witness' memory of the perpetra-
tor."100 Also, because the suggestiveness of lineup practices is notori-
ously difficult to impress upon a jury through testimony, the
requirement that lineups be videotaped is of particular usefulness.
B. New York Law Regarding Lineup Procedures
New York has considered at various times, and is considering now,
reformation of its lineup practices. Following the Central Park jogger
exonerations on December 19, 2002,"o' Brooklyn District Attorney
Charles Hynes became the first New York City district attorney to en-
dorse double-blind lineups.10 2 A bill proposed in the New York State
98 Evan J. Mandery, Due Process Considerations of In-Court Identifications, 60 ALB. L. REV.
389, 415-17 & nn.190-99 (1996) (collecting authority on social psychology issues).
99 See ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, at 33.
100 Sullivan, supra note 39, at 39; see, e.g., Gina Kolata & Iver Peterson, NewJersey is Trying
New Way for Witnesses to Say, "It's Him, "N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at Al (discussing study that
shows that the use of a sequential lineup reduces the rate of false identification from 20 to 40
percent to less than 10 percent). Note that Illinois Recommendation 12 only mandates the use
of sequential lineups where the person or persons conducting the lineup do not know which
person is the suspect. The reason is that if the sequential lineup is not double-blind, the admin-
istrator of the lineup will be able to inadvertently communicate the identity of the suspect. ILL.
REPORT, supra note 9, at 34-35 (citing Gary Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures:
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 603 (1998)).
101 People v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
102 Nancie L. Katz, Hynes to Alter Way Crime Lineups Are Done, DAILY NEWS (New York),
Dec. 23, 2002, at 16; see also Sean Gardiner, Getting It Right: Experts Eye Measures to Prevent
Injustices, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 11, 2002, at A8.
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Assembly in January 2002103 would have required shuffling lineup or-
ders where multiple witnesses are performing identifications. The bill
did not call for double-blind administration or for the videotaping of
police station lineups.
In the absence of any controlling statutory authority, New York
courts have differed over the protections to which a defendant is enti-
tled. Generally speaking, courts have not been protective against unreli-
able lineup procedures. For example, courts have ruled that the fact that
a witness knows the perpetrator is in the lineup does not prove unrelia-
bility.104  Some courts have ordered double-blind lineups where re-
quested by the defendant,10 5 but these instances remain the exception
rather than the rule. The New York City Police Department has ex-
pressed reluctance to reform lineup practices, and it has suggested that
reform by order of the courts is unlikely given the long established case
law approving existing practices."o6
Court decisions, however, do encourage videotaped lineups as a
practical matter. Courts have recognized that videotapes are especially
useful at proving the suggestiveness of lineups in a manner that testi-
mony cannot depict. 10 7 Further, courts hold that videotapes of lineups
are admissible to establish the credibility of eyewitness identification."os
Given the well-established concerns with the reliability of eyewit-
ness testimony in general, and with eyewitness testimony affected by
suggestive pretrial lineup procedures in particular, the Illinois reforms
should be evaluated as a guard against the risk of wrongful conviction.
This is of special concern in capital cases, where the risk of mistaken
identification is particularly high-the cases are especially emotional,
and because of public demand for retribution, the desire to conform to
authority is higher than normal. Of course, given the irreversibility of
103 Assemb. 9578-A, 2002 Leg., 225th Sess. (N.Y. 2002).
104 See, e.g., People v. Brown, 459 N.Y.S.2d 227, 230-31 (Westchester County Ct. 1983);
Ranta v. Bennett, No. 97 Civ. 2169, 2001 WL 11000082, at *38 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2000)
("[T]here is nothing unduly suggestive about a witness's being informed of the purpose of a
lineup . . . .").
105 See, e.g., In re Investigation of Thomas, 733 N.Y.S.2d 591, 592-93, 596 (Sup. Ct. 2001)
(ordering double-blind lineup citing unrebutted scientific evidence); People v. Wilson, 741
N.Y.S.2d 831, 835 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (granting double-blind lineup, but denying request for
sequential lineup).
106 See the comments of George A. Grasso in Kolata & Peterson, supra note 100.





executions, the cost of error is also higher than normal. Therefore, prior
to taking any action on reinstating the death penalty, the New York
Legislature should study Recommendations 10, 12 and 15 of the Illinois
Commission's report as, at a minimum, prerequisites to any capital
prosecution.
V. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
A. The Importance of Independent Review of Scientific Evidence in
Capital Cases
Both the Illinois Commission and the Massachusetts Council rec-
ommended independent scientific review of evidence presented in capi-
tal cases. The Illinois Commission recommended establishment of an
independent state forensic lab staffed by civilians and operated sepa-
rately from police agencies.' 09 The Massachusetts Council recom-
mended that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court initiate a formal
process to ensure the independent scientific review of physical or other
associative evidence in every capital case in which a sentence of capital
punishment is imposed."o
The Massachusetts Council also recommended that an Indepen-
dent Scientific Review Advisory Committee appoint independent mem-
bers to a panel whose job would be to review "the collection, handling,
evaluation, analysis, preservation, and interpretation of, and testimony
and all other matters relating to, physical or other associative evidence
presented in the particular case" in which the death sentence was im-
posed to make sure it was up to adequate standards."' The council
noted that crime labs and forensic offices throughout the country have
not always met high standards, and determined that independent evalu-
ation would assist in ensuring proper standards are met." 2 The Massa-
chusetts Council's conclusion was undoubtedly influenced by a number
of scandals that have been associated with forensic labs around the coun-
try in recent years.
The Chicago Tribune recently examined 200 DNA and death row
exoneration cases since 1986 and found that more than a quarter of
109 ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, Recommendation 20, at 52.
110 MASS. REPORT, supra note 12, Recommendation 8, at 23.
M11 Id at 24.
112 Id
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them involved faulty crime lab work or testimony.1 3 The Tribune
found that problems such as faulty blood analysis, fingerprinting errors,
flawed hair comparisons, and contamination of evidence used in DNA
testing have been discovered at crime labs in at least seventeen states as
well as the FBI crime lab. Most of these scandals came to light as a
result of independent DNA testing that led to post-conviction exonera-
tions. These cases have far-reaching consequences, as analysts involved
in faulty forensic work have testified in hundreds of trials-trials in
which jurors (especially in this era of television shows like C.S.L) likely
placed a great deal of weight on the scientific testimony."'
The Tribune series noted both a lack of independent oversight of
labs, which resist letting outsiders in, and the use of questionable science
in obtaining convictions.' 15 Part of the problem was that at state police
labs, forensic scientists saw themselves as members of the state's attor-
ney's teams rather than as independent scientists."' Further, of 260
accredited labs in the United States, 90 percent are affiliated with law
enforcement agencies and are not subject to meaningful outside re-
view." 7 Thus, the Illinois Commission and the Massachusetts Council
recognized that if a state imposes the death penalty, independent review
of scientific evidence is essential.
B. New York Law Regarding Review of Scientific Evidence
New York has no independent crime laboratory that provides for
independent review of scientific evidence. Given the weight this type of
evidence carries in court and the types of problems that have been dis-
covered in forensic labs in recent years, the establishment of an indepen-
dent laboratory, or at least a means for independent review of scientific
evidence, should be seriously considered as part of a thorough review of
New York's capital punishment system.
113 Maurice Possley et al., Scandal Touches Even Elite Labs: Flawed Work, Resistance to Scrutiny
Seen Across U.S., CHIC. TIUB., Oct. 21, 2004, at 1.
'"4 Id.
115 Flynn McRoberts et al., Forensics Under the Microscope: Unproven Techniques Sway Courts,
Erode justice, CHIC. TRIB., Oct. 17, 2004, at 1.
116 Steve Mills et al., When Crime Labs Falter, Defendants Pay: Bias Toward Prosecution Cites in
Illinois Cases, CHIC. TRIB., Oct. 20, 2004, at 1.
''7 Id.
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VI. A SIGNIFICANTLY NARROWER LIST OF DEATH PENALTY
ELIGIBILITY FACTORS
A. Importance of Narrowing the List of Death Penalty
Eligibility Factors
One major recommendation made both by the Massachusetts
Council and the Illinois Commission was that, if there is to be a death
penalty, then the list of murders eligible for the death penalty should be
quite narrow." 8 The Massachusetts Council recommended that there
be a maximum of six elements that may make one eligible to be guilty of
murder in the first degree, or capital, murder." 9 Similarly, the Illinois
Commission recommended limiting the list of eligibility factors for cap-
ital punishment to a maximum of five.' 2 0
118 Commentators have made similar recommendations, encouraging elected officials to limit
the death penalty eligibility factors and thus "reassert meaningful control over this process,
rather than letting the courts and chance perform the accommodation on an ad hoc, entirely
irrational basis." Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1, 32 (1995).
119 Specifically, the Massachusetts Council recommended that one of the following six ele-
ments must be present for murder in the first degree:
(a) The defendant committed the murder as an act of political terrorism;
(b) The defendant committed the murder for the purposes of influencing, impeding,
obstructing, hampering, delaying, harming, punishing, or otherwise interfering with a
criminal investigation, grand jury proceeding, trial, or other criminal proceeding of
any kind, including a possible future proceeding, or in retaliation for the victim's role
in the investigation or adjudication of a prior criminal case (including the implemen-
tation of the defendant's sentence), against:
(1) a victim whom the defendant knew or believed to have played an official role
within the criminal justice system . . . ; or
(2) a victim whom the defendant knew or believed to have been (i) a witness to a
crime committed on a prior occasion, or (ii) an immediate family member of
such a witness . . . .
(c) The defendant intentionally tortured the victim, for a prolonged period of time
and in a gratuitous and depraved manner, during or immediately prior to the murder;
(d) The defendant committed murder in the first degree against two or more victims
(e) The defendant has a previous conviction for murder in the first degree ...
(f) At the time the defendant engaged in the conduct ... the defendant was subject to
a sentence of imprisonment for life, without the possibility of parole, as the result of a
previous conviction for murder . . ..
MASS. REPORT, supra note 12, Recommendation 1, at 6-7.
120 Illinois Commission Recommendation 28 states:
There should be only five eligibility factors:
1. The murder of a peace officer or firefighter killed in the performance of his/her
official duties or to prevent the performance of his/her official duties, or in retaliation
for performing his/her official duties.
110 CARDOZO PUB. LAW POLICY & ETHICS ].4
The reason the Massachusetts Council recommended narrowly de-
fining the death penalty eligibility factors is that the factors make up the
"one and only place in the entire death penalty system . . . where sub-
stantive limits can be imposed on the death penalty that are not discre-
tionary." 12 1 A long list of eligibility factors would allow most murders
to be eligible for the death penalty, leaving individual prosecutors with
extraordinary discretion to decide whether to seek the death penalty.
The Massachusetts Council noted that when various decision-makers
have too much discretion within a large pool of death-eligible murders,
prejudices could influence the decision. This broad discretion contrib-
utes to the serious problem of racial disparity in application of the death
penalty.12 2 Expansive statutes also lead to geographic disparity as prose-
cutors in one county may more aggressively seek the death penalty than
prosecutors in other counties. The council thus decided to limit discre-
tion by narrowing the eligibility factors to those kinds of murders that
are among the most heinous of all crimes. 12 3
Similarly, the Illinois Commission was concerned with narrowing
the discretion of the sentencer and providing more uniform application
of the law. The Commission expressed concern that in Illinois the list
of eligibility factors (or aggravating circumstances) was so long that al-
most any murder could fit on the list.12 4 In particular, the Commission
noted that since so many murders are potentially eligible as being com-
mitted in the "course of a felony," that this aggravating circumstance
2. The murder of any person (inmate, staff, visitor, etc.), occurring at a correctional
facility.
3. The murder of two or more persons ....
4. The intentional murder of a person involving the infliction of torture ....
5. The murder by a person who is under investigation for or who has been charged
with or has been convicted of a crime which would be a felony under Illinois law, of
anyone involved in the investigation, prosecution or defense of that crime, including,
but not limited to, witnesses, jurors, judges, prosecutors and investigators.
ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, Recommendation 28, at 67-68. Regarding the fourth eligibility
factor, "torture" is defined as the
intentional and depraved infliction of extreme physical pain for a prolonged period of
time prior to the victim's death; depraved means the defendant relished the infliction
of extreme physical pain upon the victim evidencing debasement or perversion or that
the defendant evidenced a sense of pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain.
ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, Recommendation 28, at 71.
121 MASS. REPORT, supra note 12, at 10-11.
122 Id. at 11.
123 Id
124 ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, at 66-67.
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lends itself to disparate application throughout the state and allows pros-
ecutors too much discretion in deciding which cases to pursue as capital
crimes.125
B. New York Law's List of Eligibility Factors
New York has thirteen death penalty eligibility factors, including
murder for pecuniary gain and intentional felony murder for a large
number of felonies. 126 Thus, New York has more than twice the num-
ber of aggravating circumstances recommended by either the Illinois
Commission or the Massachusetts Council. New York's list encom-
passes a large number of murders, and grants the prosecutor a great deal
of discretion in deciding which cases to charge as a capital offense. Re-
cently, one death penalty supporter agreed that New York should elimi-
nate aggravating circumstances such as intentional felony murder and
killings by persons serving a life sentence.12 7
Of course, all murders are horrible crimes that create suffering and
are deserving of some type of punishment, but overbroad death penalty
statutes create arbitrariness and may be unconstitutional.' Although it
is beyond the scope of this report to determine which murders should
fall in the narrow category of capital murder, it is clear that New York's
1995 death penalty statute is overbroad.129 Narrowing the list of eligi-
bility factors, as suggested by the Illinois Commission and the Massa-
125 Id. at 72.
126 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2003). The "course of a felony" eligibility factor
is listed in section 125.27(a)(vii) and the pecuniary gain factor is listed in section 125.27(a)(vi).
Note that the intentional felony murder lists more than ten felonies that help qualify one for the
death penalty, thereby making this factor extremely broad by itself. Id. § 125.27(a)(vii).
127 Robert Blecker, Who Deserves to Die?A Time to Reconsider, 15 N.Y. L.J. 2 (2004). Profes-
sor Blecker also proposed narrowing other aggravating factors, such as circumstances involving
the killing of a witness and killings to prevent apprehension. Id. However, to follow Professor
Blecker's additional idea of adding some other factors that were not included by the Legislature
in 1995 would magnify the current arbitrariness problems. For example, his suggestion of im-
posing the death penalty for current second degree murder crimes committed recklessly with
depraved indifference, while not imposing the death penalty for other second degree intentional
murders, could result in an unconstitutional arbitrary disparity.
128 See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1980) (noting that a capital punish-
ment system must be able to distinguish the few murders that are capital from the many that are
not); see also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's
Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL Rrs. J. 345, 430-59
(1998) (noting that a large number of aggravating circumstances in a statute may make the
statute unconstitutional).
129 As a starting point, the New York Legislature should eliminate every aggravating circum-
stance that is not included in both the Illinois and Massachusetts reports' lists of the maximum
2006] 111
CARD OZO PUB. LAW POLICY &k ETHICS J
chusetts Council, would help reduce inconsistencies in New York's
application of the death penalty and also help avoid the use of capital
punishment for murders that are not among the very worst. 30
VII. USE OF DIFFERENT JURIES FOR EACH STAGE OF A
BIFURCATED CAPITAL TRIAL
A. Importance of Using Different Juries for Each Stage of a
Capital Case
In its fourth recommendation, the Massachusetts Council ad-
dressed a problem that arises when the same jury is used for both the
sentencing phase and the guilt phase.131 It noted that if a defendant
vigorously protests his innocence at the guilt-innocence stage, the defen-
dant might undermine his or her ability to accept responsibility or ex-
press remorse at the penalty phase.1 32 Because the jury has already
observed the defendant's denial of responsibility at the guilt-innocence
phase, it may not find the defendant's remorse credible.
This jury consideration presents a strategic dilemma for the defen-
dant that could be avoided if the defendant has the option of having a
new jury for the sentencing stage.' 33  The council therefore recom-
mended that if a defendant is found guilty, he or she should have the
right to choose whether to proceed to sentencing with the original jury,
or to have a new jury selected for the sentencing phase.' 3 1
An additional concern is that death penalty cases are tried under
rules that increase the chances that the innocent will be convicted as
compared to noncapital cases. One reason for this injustice is the "death
set of eligibility factors. If desired, the Association would give further input to the Legislature on
this subject.
130 A previous report by the Association raised concerns about the list of eligibility factors.
See Comm. on Capital Punishment, The Pataki Administration's Proposals to Expand the Death
Penalty, 55 REc. Ass'N B. Crry N.Y. 129 (2000). "'The more broadly the bill sweeps (e.g., by
covering felony murders), the more likely it is (a) to engender the sort of arbitrariness that the
courts have repeatedly condemned (i.e., that crimes and criminals of equal culpability will re-
ceive unequal punishment), and (b) to be held unconstitutional."' Id. (quoting Letter from
Barbara Paul Robinson, President, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 1 (Mar. 3, 1995)). As
discussed above, studies since the New York law was enacted have raised similar concerns.
131 MAss. REPORT, supra note 12, Recommendation 4, at 17-18.
132 Id. at 18.
133 Id.; see also United States v. Green, 343 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D. Mass. 2004) (requiring
bifurcated juries in a capital murder case); United States v. Green, No. CR. 02-10301-NG,
2004 WL 2998772 (D. Mass. Dec. 29, 2004) (making findings as to why bifurcation is
appropriate).
134 MASS. REPORT, supra note 12, at 18.
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qualification" of juries. The Supreme Court has held that states are
entitled to exclude potential jurors with a fixed conviction in opposition
to capital punishment.' 3  The death qualification process is concerned
with sentencing, but it affects the guilt phase as well. Because death-
qualified juries are more likely to find a defendant guilty, the death
qualification process results in a non-representative biased jury at the
guilt phase.' 3 6 Therefore, a bifurcated jury system would allow courts to
do the death qualification process only for the sentencing jury, allowing
the guilt phase jury to be unbiased.
B. New York Law Regarding Sentencing juries
New York does not provide defendants with the option of a new
jury for sentencing, thus limiting defendants' strategic options. The leg-
islature should consider studies that show that death-qualified juries,
like those in New York, are less accurate in their assessment of guilt than
ordinary juries. '3
Further, other studies have pointed out other problems with using
the same jury for the guilt phase and the sentencing phase of a capital
trial.' 3  For example, "studies suggest that death-qualification leads to
the exclusion of a disproportionate number of black and female jurors,"
so using a death-qualified jury for both the guilt phase and sentencing
phase results in the limitation of black and female jurors deciding
whether or not a defendant is guilty.'3 9 Therefore, because of the inher-
ent bias and problems resulting from death qualification, should New
York decide to reinstate its capital punishment laws, it should provide
135 See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (holding that a prospective juror may be
excluded for cause when the juror's views on capital punishment would "prevent or substantially
impair" the juror in performing her or his duties). See also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510 (1968).
136 See, e.g., James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REv 2030,
2097 & n.16 4 (2000) (describing studies demonstrating that the death qualification process
produces juries more likely to convict than non-death-qualified juries); Susan D. Rozelle, The
Utility of Witt: Understanding the Language of Death Qualification, 54 BAYLOR L. REv. 677, 692-
96 (2002); see also Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Ass'n in Support of Petitioner
at 16, Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1985) (No. 84-1865); Joseph W. Filkins et al., An
Evaluation of the Biasing Effects of Death Qualification: A Meta-Analytic/Computer Simulation
Approach, in THEORY AND RESEARCH ON SMALL GROUPS 153, 153-75 (R. Scott Tindale at al.
eds., 1998).
137 See Rozelle, supra note 136, at 692-96.
138 See, e.g., Craig Haney et al., "Modern"Death Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing Effects,
18 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 619 (1994).
139 See United States v. Green, 343 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33 (D. Mass. 2004).
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capital defendants the right to have a new jury selected for the sentenc-
ing phase.140
VIII. A HEIGHTENED BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Importance of a Heightened Burden of Proof in Capital Cases
The Massachusetts Council recommended that at the sentencing
stage, as a prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty, the jury
should be required to find that there is "no doubt" about the defen-
dant's guilt of capital murder.14 ' This recommendation was made to
allow any residual or lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt, even
after a conviction, to be sufficient to preclude imposition of the death
penalty. The Massachusetts Council made this recommendation based
on its determination that a higher standard of proof at sentencing could
prevent potential mistakes if the jury has some concerns over its
verdict. 142
Additionally, as discussed in the previous section, death-qualified
juries have been shown to favor the prosecution and be less accurate in
assessing evidence than regular juries. 14 3 Thus, the heightened burden
of proof may assist in preventing wrongful convictions in capital cases.
Furthermore, the heightened burden may discourage prosecutors from
seeking the death penalty in cases in which the death penalty may not
be truly warranted simply because it is easier to secure a conviction from
a jury in a capital case.
B. New York Law Regarding Heightened Burden of Proof
New York has no law allowing residual doubt to preclude imposi-
tion of the death sentence in the sentencing phase, but this recommen-
dation should be considered as part of a comprehensive review of the
capital punishment system. This heightened burden of proof is particu-
larly necessary in light of studies that show that death-qualified juries,
like those in New York, are less accurate in their assessment of guilt than
ordinary juries."4
140 The Legislature should look to other states to see the options for how a separate sentenc-
ing jury is instructed. Again, the Association would be willing to comment on the various
options.
141 MASS. REPORT, supra note 12, Recommendation 7, at 22-23.
142 Id. at 22.
143 See supra Section VII.A.
144 See Rozelle, supra note 136, at 692-96.
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IX. DISCRETION OF JUDGES TO OVERTURN DEATH SENTENCES
THEY BELIEVE ARE UNWARRANTED
A. Importance ofJudicial Discretion to Overturn Death Sentences
Both the Massachusetts Council and the Illinois Commission rec-
ommended giving judges broad authority to set aside a jury's recom-
mendation for a death sentence at the time of the trial. The Illinois
Commission's Recommendation 66 states:
After the jury renders its judgment with respect to the imposition of
the death penalty, the trial judge should be required to indicate on the
record whether he or she concurs in the result. In cases where the trial
judge does not concur in the imposition of the death penalty, the
defendant shall be sentenced to natural life as a mandatory alternative
(assuming adoption of the new death penalty scheme limited to five
eligibility factors). 1 5
The Massachusetts' Council recommended allowing the judge to
decide that a case is not death-eligible before the trial.' 6 Also, as with
the Illinois recommendation, the Massachusetts Council recommended
that after trial, the judge could set aside the verdict of guilt of capital
murder and the corresponding death sentence and direct the entry of a
verdict of guilt of first degree murder if the judge finds the sentence to
be inappropriate for any reason, including if the judge simply disagrees
with the jury.14 7 Both the Illinois Commission and the Massachusetts
Council found that trial judges are in the best position to correct any
mistakes a jury may have made. The Illinois Commission further found
that requiring the concurrence of a judge in death sentences would be a
way to address the issues of residual doubt and unacceptable bias (a
problem that the Massachusetts Council also handled by recommending
the option of a second jury for sentencing as discussed in Section
VII). 148
In addition, both the Illinois Commission and the Massachusetts
Council recommended allowing courts broad authority to consider new
evidence and substantively review death penalty convictions and
145 ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, Recommendation 66, at 152.
146 MAss. REPORT, supra note 12, Recommendation 9, at 25-28.
147 Id.
148 ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, at 153.
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sentences in post-conviction proceedings.' 4 9 The Illinois Commission
and the Massachusetts Council both concluded it was important to
grant courts the authority to reverse death sentences they do not believe
are warranted, and that procedural bars and narrow legal constructions
should not impede judges'. ability to determine that a sentence has been
wrongfully imposed. For example, the Illinois Commission suggested
an amendment of the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act to allow
claims of actual innocence at any time after a conviction, regardless of
other time limits on presenting new evidence.15 o
Similarly, the Massachusetts Council recommended allowing ap-
pellate courts to overturn death penalty cases on substantive and not
merely procedural grounds."' It noted that the Illinois Supreme Court
was recently granted authority under the "Fundamental Justice Amend-
ment" to reverse any death sentence it finds fundamentally unjust on
the facts of the case. 1 52 It then recommended that in death penalty
cases, the Massachusetts Supreme Court also exercise this substantive
review authority "without regard to any procedural default rules or other
procedural barriers to review, including a defendant's failure to properly
raise issues in prior proceedings."' 5 3 The council reasoned that appellate
courts have the final responsibility to ensure the appropriateness of the
death sentence in an individual case, and that they should not be con-
strained by procedural issues if they wish to reverse a death sentence that
appears unjust.5 4 Both recommendations help to ensure that new evi-
dence, when it would undermine confidence in the outcome of a trial, is
not overlooked for procedural reasons.
B. New York Law Regarding judicial Discretion to Overturn
Death Sentences
Although under New York law a trial judge can set aside a death
sentence on the motion of the defendant,15 the Illinois and Massachu-
setts recommendations would grant judges broader authority to set aside
a jury's verdict sua sponte if they determine that the sentence is unjust.
149 MASS. REPORT, supra note 12, Recommendation 9, at 25-28; ILL. REPORT, supra note 9,
Recommendation 74, at 171-73.
150 ILL. REPORT, supra note 9, Recommendation 74, at 171.
151 MAss. REPORT, supra note 12, Recommendation 9, at 26-27.
152 Id. at 26.
153 Id.
154 MASS. REPORT, supra note 12, Recommendation 9, at 27.
155 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 440.20 (McKinney 2005).
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Also, various procedural bars apply in New York that may prevent de-
fendants from bringing forth belatedly discovered new evidence of
innocence. 15
Therefore, these recommendations should be considered as addi-
tional precautions to prevent the execution of innocent persons. Ex-
panding judicial discretion may also help prevent over-application of the
death penalty to crimes that are not the "worst" crimes and to defend-
ants who have significant mitigating factors, such as mental illness, that
may not have been properly considered by the jury.1 7 Allowing broad
judicial discretion to overturn death sentences may also help alleviate
racial and geographic disparities in the application of the death penalty,
to the extent they may not be adequately dealt with by an overall pro-
portionality review.'
X. AN ONGOING REVIEW COMMISSION
A. Importance of an Ongoing Review Commission
The Massachusetts Council's final recommendation was for the
creation of a death penalty review commission to investigate claims of
substantive error made by any person subject to a death sentence.'"9
The findings of its investigations would be made public and could be
the basis for reform of a capital punishment system. The council noted
that such commissions exist in England and Canada and have resulted
in some number of convictions being set aside.' 60
In addition to the Massachusetts Council's recommendation, New
York should consider New Jersey's success with proportionality review as
one means of ensuring consistency in capital sentencing. In New Jersey,
a special master appointed by the New Jersey Supreme Court maintains
an extensive statistical database to determine trends in prosecution and
jury attitudes and whether community standards of decency support the
156 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (1) (g) (McKinney 2005).
157 Studies show that jurors often give inconsistent consideration to mitigating circumstances.
See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do jurors Think?,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538 (1998) (summarizing the results of a survey in which jurors were
asked questions about the various statutorily-defined mitigating factors).
158 For example, studies of New York's recent experience with capital punishment indicates a
geographic disparity in the way it is applied. See, e.g., Gene Warner, Counties Differ Widely in
Invoking Death Penalty, BUFFALO NEWS, July 9, 2001, at Al.
159 MAsS. REPORT, supra note 12, Recommendation 10, at 28-29.
160 Id
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death penalty for a particular category of criminal.""' In 2002, the New
Jersey Supreme Court struck down a sentence on proportionality
grounds, becoming the first state supreme court to do so on the basis of
statistical evidence of disproportionality.16 2 New York should examine
New Jersey's approach to determining proportionality of sentencing and
consider ways to ensure that the death penalty is applied in a propor-
tional manner.
B. New York Law Regarding a Review Commission
Although the New York Court of Appeals has promulgated rules
regarding capital case data reports, 63 no commission has been estab-
lished to review wrongful convictions. If the death penalty is reinstated
in New York, an ongoing study of the capital punishment system should
be mandatory to help ensure that mistakes are caught, sentences are
proportional, and reforms are made as necessary.
CONCLUSION: LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE SINCE 1995
Since New York established the death penalty in 1995, numerous
developments have provided new insight into the failures of capital pun-
ishment systems around the country. For example, through the use of
scientific knowledge developed during the past decade, we now know
that a number of convicted murder defendants were innocent.' Fur-
ther, because of systemic problems and the fact that DNA evidence is
not available in every case, we still have not discovered all of the current
161 In re Proportionality Review Project (II), 757 A.2d 168 (N.J. 2000).
162 State v. Papasavvas, 790 A.2d 798 (N.J. 2002) (holding that defendant's death sentence
was disproportionate to sentences imposed in similar cases).
163 See N.Y. R. CT. § 510.18(a). Even these reports, however, do not give an adequate review
because they only consider actual capital cases and do not consider all cases that could have been
brought as first-degree murder capital cases. See id.
164 For example, in 2002, Newsday ran a four-part series, entitled The Wronged Men, consist-
ing of several articles about cases of wrongful convictions in New York during the 1980's and
1990's. See, e.g, Sean Gardiner, Dynamics of Righting a Wrong: The DA 's Role in Reversals,
NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 10, 2002, at A35; Sean Gardiner, For Them, No justice: Bad convic-
tions Put 13 Men in Prison, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 8, 2002, at A3; Sean Gardiner, Getting
It Right: Experts Eye Measures to Prevent Injustices, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 11, 2002, at A8;
Sean Gardiner & Herbert Lowe, Free to Struggle, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 9, 2002, at A6;
Herbert Lowe, Friend Becomes Freedom Fighter, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 10, 2002, at A7;
Graham Rayman, Wrongfidly Convicted: Two pursue cash awards, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec.
14, 2002, at A31; see also RONALD C. DEITER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., INNOCENCE AND




innocent inmates, and the innocent will continue to be convicted of
capital crimes. In addition to innocence concerns, there are other capi-
tal sentencing problems that make the capital sentencing results arbi-
trary. The risks of wrongful conviction and arbitrariness exist in New
York, which lacks several of the criminal justice reforms recommended
by the Illinois Commission and the Massachusetts Council.
Before the New York Legislature considers whether to re-institute
the death penalty, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
urges the legislature to evaluate the wealth of research that has been
done since 1995. Analysis should begin with the issues discussed in this
report and the recommendations developed in Illinois and Massachu-
setts. As a start, there needs to be an evaluation of the need for rules
regarding informant testimony, rules regarding witness testimony, vide-
otaped interrogations, lineup procedures, the use of scientific evidence, a
narrower list of eligibility factors, the use of bifurcated juries, a height-
ened burden of proof for capital cases, greater judicial discretion, and
the creation of an ongoing review commission. Adoption of laws and
procedures in these areas could lead to a less inaccurate and less unfair
system with regard to capital punishment.
The recommendations in this report, however, are only the begin-
ning of an attempt to limit arbitrariness and unfairness in New York's
criminal justice system with post-1995 knowledge. For example, any
in-depth examination should also consider whether New York's death
penalty statute sufficiently protects against arbitrariness and racial dis-
crimination 1 and ensures that people with significant mental illness are
not subject to execution.'16  Similarly, in light of new studies, the legis-
lature should examine the danger that existing jury charges may be inad-
equate to prevent jurors from basing their decisions on
misunderstandings of the law.16 7 Finally, in addition to consideration
165 See, e.g., RAYMOND PATERNOSTER ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARYLAND'S
DEATH SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF RACE AND LEGAL JURIS-
DICTION (2003), available at http://www.newsdesk.umd.edu/pdf/finalrep.pdf. This recent
study, commissioned by the governor of Maryland, found that race and geography within the
state affected who received the death penalty. Id. at 41.
166 See, e.g., NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (2004), available at http://www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Pol-
icy/WhereWeStand/TheCriminalization of PeoplewithMentalIllness "WHERE
WESTAND.htm.
167 A number of recent studies indicate "the penalty phase instructions in capital murder
trials produce high levels of confusion in the minds of jurors." Richard L. Wiener et al., Guided
Jury Discretion in Capital Murder Cases: The Role of Declarative and Procedural Knowledge, 10
2006] 119
120 CARDOZO PUB. LAW POLICY & ETHICS J [Vol. 4:85
of the recommendations from the Illinois Commission and the Massa-
chusetts Council, the legislature should consider recent recommenda-
tions made by the Constitution Project,"6 s the American Bar
Association's Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities' proto-
cols, 1 6 9 the American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 170 and
any additional reputable studies that are released.
This Report shows the necessity of a thorough analysis of post-
1995 studies and New York's laws before seriously considering reinstate-
ment of the death penalty. Such changes and analysis are essential to
protecting the innocent, providing fairness, and improving the quality
of justice in the Empire State.
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 516, 571 (2004); see also James R.P. Ogloff& Sonia R. Copra, Stuck
in the Dark Ages: Supreme Court Decision Making and Legal Developments, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 379, 402 (2004) (noting "a large body of research, using differing methodologies,
which suggested that capital jury instructions are poorly understood").
168 THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORY JUSTICE: EIGHTEEN REFORMS TO THE
DEATH PENALTY (2001), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Mandatoryjus-
ticel.pdf. The Constitution Project created a bipartisan committee of both death penalty sup-
porters and opponents to create recommendations to address problems with the death penalty.
Id. at ix.
169 Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Individual Rights & Responsibilities, Death Without justice: A
Guide for Examining the Administration of the Death Penalty in the United States, 63 OHIO ST.
L.J. 487 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/finaljune28.pdf.
170 Am. Bar Ass'n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913 (2003) [hereinafter ABA Counsel Guide-
lines]. The Supreme Court of the United States has noted the significance of the ABA Counsel
Guidelines. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (invalidating a death sentence
when the performance of defense lawyers "fell short of the standards for capital defense work
articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA)-standards to which we have long referred as
'guides to determining what is reasonable"').
It is essential that the New York Legislature review New York's post-conviction process in
light of the ABA Counsel Guidelines. In recent testimony before members of the New York
Assembly, Professor Eric M. Freedman, who served as reporter for the ABA Counsel Guidelines,
noted that New York's system of post-conviction defense fails the standards of the ABA Counsel
Guidelines and "to bring the system into compliance would require a significant structural over-
haul and accompanying financial investment." joint Public Hearing ofNew York Assembly Stand-
ing Committees on Codes, Judiciary, and Correction Regarding the Death Penalty in New York, 2004
Leg., 227th Sess. 3 (N.Y. Dec. 15, 2004) (testimony of Professor Eric M. Freedman, Hofstra
Law School).
